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Reconstructing the Rule of Law
ROBIN WEST*
Many thanks to the organizers of this event, and much gratitude to Mark
Tushnet, whose work, collegiality, and friendship we honor today.
Let me begin by noting that there is a seventh response to Bush v. Gore' not
included in Balkin and Levinson's litany of responses2 but expounded at length
in an article published a few weeks back in the Nation, by Vince Bugliosi, the
ex-District Attorney for the City of Los Angeles.3 The action taken by the five
conservative Justices on the United States Supreme Court, Bugliosi argued, was
not just wrong as a matter of law, but criminal: It was a malem in se, fully
intended, premeditated theft of a national election for the Presidency of the
United States.4 Now, as Balkan and Levinson would argue, this seventh,
"prosecutorial" response-that the Court's action was not just wrong but crimi-
nal-is also not available to a devotee of either radical or moderate indetermi-
nacy. Even assuming both criminal intent and severe harm-a wrongful, specific
intent to thwart the democratic outcome and a profound harm to democracy-an
element of the crime, namely the act, which in this case has to be misstating the
law, cannot be borne out. The indeterminacy thesis, if true, logically precludes
the moral or legal condemnation of a certain sort of criminality and venality-
that of the official who intentionally and with harmful consequences violates an
oath to uphold the law. If the indeterminacy thesis is correct, then there is no
demonstrable violation of an oath to uphold the law merely because conclusion
X does not follow from premises A and B, and there is no sense in trying to
show one. More broadly, there is no sense, given indeterminacy, to holding this
particular act of power (either Bush v. Gore itself or any other judicial construc-
tion or misconstruction of law) to the light of reason-at least, if by the light of
reason we mean the light of legal reason. One can hold up power to the light of
power, but nothing much follows morally from doing so, although quite a bit
may follow politically, as Stanley Fish has never tired of reminding us.
5
There is a basic incompatibility between the indeterminacy thesis on the one
hand and, on the other, the moral condemnation of official conduct as violative
of one's duty to uphold the law. This incompatibility is, I think, what lies behind
Frank Michelman's unease at being asked to sign the law professors' letter
declaring his sense of "betrayal" by the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, as a
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law
Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEo. L.J. 173, 188-91 (2001).
3. Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 11.
4. Id.
5. See STANLEY FIsH, Is THERE A TExT IN Tins CLASS (1980); STANLEY FIsH, TilE"'s No SUCH THING AS
FREE SPEECH (AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too) (1994). See generally Stanley Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7
CARDOzo L. Rav. 645 (1986).
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law professor dedicated to the Rule of Law6 (although he may just be reacting
against the pomposity). The Rule of Law, presumably (or at least so the law
professors' letter seems to imply) requires that decisions be logically deduced
from prior decisions, and this decision cannot be so derived. But, Michelman
worries, logical deduction of legal conclusions from what went before is flatly
impossible, and everyone now teaching law knows that. There just isn't some
mosaic or tapestry or seamless web of prior material-statutes, codes, decisions,
constitutions, texts, primary documents, and all the inferences one can possibly
draw from all of that-from which it follows that Bush v. Gore was wrong. It is
indeed the case that Bush v. Gore does not follow logically from prior decisions,
but that inconsistency can be claimed for many decisions, certainly including,
for instance, Brown v. Board of Education7 or Holmes's dissent in Lochner v.
New York.8 If the worst that lawyers-as-lawyers can say of Bush v. Gore is that it
just does not follow from what went before-well, then, however bad, horrific,
or imponderable the consequences of this terrible decision and however wrong-
ful, deceitful, self-serving, or short-sighted the intent of the Justices that decided
it, there has been no professional betrayal of our ethical identity as lawyers.
Whatever disgust or anger or betrayal we feel is political, pure and simple, not
legal. There is no determinate legal ground to stand on, if one wishes to cloak
that disgust in the Rule of Law, once one grasps the inescapable meaning of
even moderate versions of the indeterminacy thesis. If we're angry, we're angry
as politically involved citizens, not as professional upholders of the Rule of
Law. This is what law professors, particularly those committed to critical legal
theory, perhaps even more so than lawyers, specifically know. It hardly makes
sense for us to claim a betrayal when our description of the betrayal is
contradicted by what we specifically and professionally know.
I am not a devotee of indeterminacy, and I think someone ought to respond to
Bugliosi's argument. He is one angry prosecutor who has no patience for critical
legal studies or the indeterminacy thesis; unlike the critical legal professoriate,
he has indeed devoted his professional life to upholding the Rule of Law. He
feels, as a prosecutor, profoundly betrayed. But that task-responding to or
fleshing out Bugliosi's argument-is not what I want to ask or do here, in part
because it takes us way too far afield from Mark Tushnet's work. Instead, I want
to ask a question regarding those who share, to some degree, Bugliosi's anger
and his palpable sense of betrayal, but don't share his commitment to determi-
nacy. The question, which I think is raised by both Balkin and Levinson's and
Michelman's papers, is whether it follows from the incompatibility of the
indeterminacy thesis with the condemnation of official conduct as wrongful-an
incompatibility I provisionally grant-that there are no legal, professional,
lawyerly grounds on which to morally criticize either the constitutional decision
6. Frank I. Michelman, Tushnet's Realism, Tushnets Liberalism, 90 GEO. L.J. 199, 213-14 (2001).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of the Court in Bush v. Gore or any other. Levinson, Balkin, and perhaps
Michelman all seem to assume, or worry, that the answer to that question is
yes.9 They seem to assume, in other words, that if we are morally outraged as
lawyers by this decision, it must be because we think the decision is wrong, but
that we cannot possibly think that the decision is wrong if we hold to some
version of the indeterminacy thesis. What follows, they worry, is that the moral
outrage we profess to feel is either disingenuous, false consciousness, or just not
connected in any meaningful way to our identity as lawyers. But that worry
seems wrong. "Legal determinacy" does not exhaust the moral ideal of law or
the moral idea sometimes expressed by the Rule of Law or the moral ideals for
which lawyers qua lawyers may speak, the breach of which may induce a
feeling of betrayal in lawyers. Any feeling of outrage about Bush v. Gore for
violating a Rule of Law requiring determinate answers to legal questions would
necessarily be hypocritical; however, that hypocrisy does not preclude the
existence of secular ideals, so to speak, to which at least some lawyers, as
lawyers, owe some special loyalty, and regarding the breach of which some
lawyers, as lawyers, have both a claim and a duty to speak.
Let me give two examples of moral ideals that may be embedded in the Rule
of Law, ideals that are untouched by the tattered idea of legal determinacy and
the vacuous idea of the Rule of Law on which determinacy rests. The first is
drawn indirectly from Tushnet's work and the second directly.
First, some lawyers (not all) may be professionally committed to the Rule of
Law, by which is meant not determinacy or judicial objectivity, but rather, an
understanding, roughly, of the quasi-Hobbesian moral value to the human
community of law over lawlessness. Many lawyers understand, professionally
and morally, that law is, for the most part, better than no-law. Some lawyers are
so committed to that proposition, in fact, that we are mightily tempted, when
faced with sure-fire counter-examples-that is, with law that is demonstrably
worse than any real or imagined state of nature-to unmask those truly horrific
legal regimes so as to expose them as in fact unlawful, an instance of "not-law."
The moral point of that commitment, for some lawyers, is basically an opposi-
tion to, maybe even a revulsion toward, the wrongful subordination of some
persons to others, through the medium of the others' superior strength; law,
then, when envisioned as better than no-law, is better than a state of nature in
which the strong dominate and exploit the weak.
Understood in this way, the idea of law and the ideal of the Rule of Law have
a direct and definitional connection to an utterly constructed, thoroughly unnatu-
ral, humanistic, and humane egalitarianism. Law tempers, regulates, controls,
and mitigates the misery inflicted by the strong on the weak in its absence. (This
is, I think, the ideal and idea of law, not just politics, embedded in Tushnet's
9. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 192-96; Michelman, supra note 5, at 200-04.
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youthful remark regarding the Constitution and socialism.)1° Of course, this is
an ideal of law. Law in practice doesn't always work this way; in fact, law in
practice is easily co-opted by the strong toward their interest. When this
co-opting occurs, law becomes a mask of power rather than a check upon it. But
that law can be perverted in this way, even on a massive and global scale,
underscores rather than undercuts its essence: Law is a more or less good thing,
when and because it tempers the aggressions of the strong; it betters the
condition of the weak; it makes life less brutal, less nasty, and a little longer,
for all.
If so, then lawyers have a role-defined, professionally constituted, critical,
and moral obligation to decry, protest, and correct when possible, pockets of
lawlessness. This is true particularly when those pockets reflect either a will-
fully neglectful state or a virulently aggressive state-a state that has identified
itself with or yoked itself to oppression. This lawlessness must be opposed
wherever it appears: in unchecked, unpoliced violence in domestic homes
insulated against the intrusion of law by spheres of privacy; in unchecked,
rarely noticed violence on the playground insulated against legal regulation by
bizarre norms of in loco parentis combined with destructive and discredited
"naturalist" theories of childhood and particularly male childhood aggression; in
unchecked, unregulated exploitative workplaces worldwide, protected against
the intrusion of protective law by constitutional and increasingly international
norms of individual and corporate right, property, and trade. The lawyer decry-
ing these pockets of lawlessness may be expressing a "politics"-there is, I
suppose, a politics embedded in a preference not to allow people to be beaten to
a bloody pulp so as to ensure the privacy of their intimate partners; there is a
politics in a preference not to allow children to harass and bully each other in
ways that are treated as criminal when engaged in by adults, but to which adults
and the state turn a collective blind eye (at least until one of the victims of this
unregulated harassment finds his parent's unregulated, unlicensed gun); and
there is a politics in a preference not to allow employers to lock their employees
in chicken factories so as to cut down on bathroom and cigarette breaks, thus
risking their deaths in the substantial likelihood of a fire. But politics is not the
only force at work when lawyers object to this lawlessness; there is also a moral
value working, and it is a moral value itself embedded in the good that is law.
The lawyer professionally committed to the moral value of the Rule of Law, so
understood, has a critical (in both senses) role to play in decrying the peculiar
form of social injustice that is found in lawlessness.
Second, a lawyer may be committed to an idea of the Rule of Law that is
roughly convergent with the set of legal ideals and principles--equality, democ-
racy, and liberty--contained in what Mark Tushnet now calls the "thin Constitu-
10. Mark Tushnet, The Dilemma of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981)
(stating that Tushnet would decide cases by finding the result that is "likely to advance the cause of
socialism").
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tion."' If so, those moral values, embedded in law, might inform legal criticism
and might also inform a sense of outrage by a decision like Bush v. Gore. The
coherence of that critical relation between the thin Constitution and the object
of legal critique is in no way dependent upon the false idol of determinacy.
Thus, just as pockets of lawlessness can be criticized by reference to an ideal of
the Rule of Law central to legalism, so the thick, interpreted, judicially-
controlled Constitution (and any part of it, as well as any other aspect of social
reality) may be subjected to moral critique by reference to the moral and
political ideals of the thin Constitution-the aspirational legal and constitutional
commitment of the national government of the United States to justice, democ-
racy, and equality.
The critical claim here is not that a line of cases or a case is violative of a
particular constitutional meaning or text. Again, that is what is precluded by a
commitment to indeterminacy. Rather, the claim is that a line of cases or a case
or a social reality is violative of a particular constitutional ideal. At the extreme
(which may not be so extreme) the critical claim may be coherently mounted
that the entire thick Constitution-judicially controlled and generated, from
Marbury12 to Dred Scott13 to Plessy14 to Brown 15 to Griswold,16 Roe,1 7 Casey,18
Morrison,'9 and Bush v. Gore20 -whether determinate or not, is no longer what
Tushnet, quoting Lincoln, refers to as the silver frame around the golden
apple. 2 Rather, it has become a danger to the golden apple. It has become, to
mix the metaphor, a ravenous beast that is devouring-tearing to shreds-the
commitment to democracy, happiness, and social justice at the heart of the thin
Constitution. If so, then the publicly involved lawyer, as a lawyer, has a moral
obligation to sound the alarm. The people---constituted by, committed to, and
possibly loyal to, the thin Constitution-do after all have a right to be informed.
So the idealized lawyer, committed to both the Rule of Law and to constitution-
alism, may indeed feel betrayed because of a Court's decision, but it need not
follow that this lawyer is thereby committed to either a false idol of legal
determinacy or to the thick Constitution imposed upon us by this or any Court.
It may be, instead, that he holds a professional, lawyerly commitment to the
11. MARK TUsHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000). In this work, Tushnet
argues for an appreciation of the Constitution's commitments, expressed in the Preamble, to justice and
happiness, and argues that these commitments should play a role, not in judicial deliberation, but in
political struggle. It is this "thin Constitution" that he argues is endangered, rather than protected, by
judicial review.
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
14. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
19. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
20. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
21. TUsHNET, supra note 11, at 11.
20011
HeinOnline -- 90 Geo. L.J. 219 2001-2002
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
humanitarian goodness at the heart of the Rule of Law and the democratic ideal
that informs the sweet fruit of the thin Constitution. This ideal lawyer is not
morally emasculated, pardon the militaristic image, by the indeterminacy cri-
tique, for the simple reason that he recognizes that the moral value of both law
and constitutionalism is dependent upon neither the determinacy of law nor the
wisdom of judicial review. The moral value of law lies not in its "determinacy,"
but in its facilitation of an egalitarian and just peace. The moral value of our
Constitution lies not in the objectivity of the judges that maintain it, but in its
democratic and humanistic aspirations toward justice. The moral-critical lawyer,
and his surprising capacity to feel betrayed, is not undercut by the discovery of
even radical indeterminacy.
So, the surprising and novel sense of having been betrayed by the Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore, a sensation which was experienced by many street
savvy and sophisticated lawyers (who are not in the habit of worshipping at the
feet of false idols, and particularly not in the habit of worshipping at the false
idol of legal determinacy), may be traced to a forgotten commitment to the
moral import of other legal ideals-ideals embedded in a Rule of Law that puts
law in the service of the community rather than the strong; in an idea of rights
that actually empowers rather than starves and deceives those who possess
them; in an idea of justice tied to community rather than to the past or to profit;
and lastly, to an idea of the Constitution as expressive of democratic urgings for
a just and communal happiness, rather than one that is expressive of nothing but
regressive constraints imposed by pretenders to the throne of objectivity in the
name of preferencing a strong individualism over the will of peoples.
If so, then the lawyer's feeling of outrage is based neither in an indefensible
claim of legal determinacy, nor in a purely political disgust with the outcome of
the decision. Rather, Bush v. Gore, regardless of whether its reasoning can be
defended as determined by prior law, pitted this Court and its interpreted
Constitution against the legal ideals of the thin Constitution-ideals that are
constitutive of lawyering as well as of this country-and did so, furthermore, in
order to empower an administration expressly hostile to the idea of law as
expressive of a fundamental commitment to those disempowered by economic
or physical states of nature. It is not all that surprising that lawyers wedded
however unconsciously to this complicated legal identity felt betrayed by such
an act. I do think, if I might be allowed a normative moment, that it would
behoove us as critical, radical, progressive, or liberal lawyers to commit our-
selves to the project of rehabilitating, articulating, and enriching the promissory
legal ideals so betrayed-and doing so in the name of an understanding of law,
not solely in the name of politics.
So, what is the role of the lawyer, or the law professor, who feels betrayed by
this decision? For those with a commitment to the ideal of law as expressed by
the idea of legal determinacy, perhaps the thing to do is to register one's
dissent-although, because Justices Ginsburg and Souter have already done
that, it is hard to know what one may add. But for lawyers who feel no
[Vol. 90:215
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allegiance to legal determinacy and who nevertheless feel betrayed by Bush v.
Gore, I think there are two possible paths. One is to demonstrate, once again,
the indeterminacy of the law, and hence the falsity and even disingenuousness
of the Court's claim of necessity-the Court's claim, in other words, that in
spite of their love of democracy and respect for the will of the people, the law of
Florida and of the Equal Protection Clause compelled them to halt the counting
of votes. The other, and I think more fruitful path, is to engage in what may be
called legal protest, by which I mean not protest that happens to be lawful, but
rather, protest on behalf of and toward the end of the Rule of Law and the thin
Constitution both.
In an early book, Martin Luther King noted that while returning home to
Atlanta from Boston University in a club car on a southbound train, as the train
crossed the Mason-Dixon line, a dark curtain would descend in the club car,
separating whites from coloreds, leaving him in shadow. "I felt," King said, "as
though the curtain had dropped on my selfhood. '' 22 What does one do, precisely,
when one feels, and fears, a curtain of injustice falling, casting a shadow on
egalitarian ideals for law and on democratic ideals of constitutionalism, casting
the Constitution, the Preamble, and any decently humanitarian ideal of justice in
shadow? With all due apologies for the appropriation, I submit that when faced
with the imminent darkness of injustice, no less than when faced with the
imminent darkness of death, one ought not go gentle into that good night.
Rather, one should rage, said our poet of protest, against the dying of the light.23
Dylan Thomas gave us, you may recall, as examples of those who do not go
gentle into that good night, the Nietzschean man of action and the Emersonian
man of wisdom. What he did not explain in that poem or elsewhere was how an
exceedingly, painfully, gentle man-a man who is also an intellectual, a lawyer,
and a constitutional historian, but more than all of that, a gentle man-can
follow suit and not gently succumb to the night of injustice. In Mark Tushnet's
case, he wrote a book. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, contrary
to all my expectations, is Mark's gentle, lawful, measured, and intellectual
expression of his rage against the dying of our Constitution's light. And because
of that I thank him for writing it and today's speakers for raising such provoca-
tive questions about it. And I thank you for listening.
22. STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SouND: A LiFE OF MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR. 17 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
23. DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night, in THE POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 207,
207-08 (Daniel Jones ed., 1971).
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